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Abstract
The results in Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005) suggested that the long-run relationship
between the US’s and Mexico’s manufacturing sectors was weakened after China joined the
World Trade Organization (WTO). When that paper was made, however, this shock was too
recent and, therefore, the analysis was based only on end-of-sample structural break tests.
In this note we use updated information to revisit this issue. The results suggest that, by
shifting resources towards those sectors where it remained competitive, Mexico’s response
allowed the eﬀect of China’s entry to the WTO on its long-term relationship with the U.S.
manufacturing sector to be only temporary.
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Resumen
Los resultados en Chiquiar y Ramos-Francia (2005) suger´ ıan que la relaci´ on de largo plazo
entre los sectores manufactureros de M´ exico y Estados Unidos se debilit´ o despu´ es de que
China entr´ o a la Organizaci´ on Mundial de Comercio (OMC). Cuando se llev´ o a cabo ese
documento, sin embargo, este choque hab´ ıa sido muy reciente y, por ende, el an´ alisis se
bas´ o exclusivamente en pruebas de cambio estructural al ﬁnal de la muestra. En esta nota, se
utiliza informaci´ on actualizada para analizar nuevamente este tema. Los resultados sugieren
que, al haber reasignado recursos hacia sectores en los que permaneci´ o siendo competitiva, la
respuesta de la econom´ ıa mexicana permiti´ o que el efecto de la entrada de China a la OMC
sobre su relaci´ on de largo plazo con el sector manufacturero estadounidense fuera ´ unicamente
temporal.
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In Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005), we provided evidence that China’s entry 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) seems to have led to a decrease in Mexico’s 
export share in the U.S. market and to an apparent weakening of the degree of business 
cycle synchronization between the manufacturing sectors of Mexico and the U.S. This 
seems to have been a result of Mexico’s loss of comparative advantage in some 
manufacturing product categories in which it had previously specialized in, as a 
consequence of China’s increased market access.
1
As was pointed out in the conclusions of that article, however, most of the 
evidence supporting the results was based on newly-developed end-of-sample structural 
break tests, which did not allow us to distinguish if the structural break took the form of 
a downward level shift in Mexico’s relative output levels or of a decrease in their 
elasticity with respect to U.S. output. More importantly, the evidence was not sufficient 
to discard the possibility that the apparent weakening of the links between Mexico and 
U.S. manufacturing was a temporary phenomenon, driven by an extraordinarily long lag 
in Mexico’s response to the upturn in U.S. manufacturing after the 2001 recession. We 
therefore acknowledged that future data was needed to distinguish more clearly between 
these possibilities. 
In this context, it is relevant to note that a large part of the evidence in Chiquiar 
and Ramos-Francia (2005) relied on a disaggregated analysis, in which the degree of 
cyclical synchronization between Mexico and the U.S. was assessed at a sector-by-
sector level. We showed that there were specific sectors where Mexico and U.S. 
production links were especially affected after China’s entry into the WTO, and this is 
what seems to have led to an apparent breakdown of cointegration between the 
aggregate series of manufacturing production in these two countries after 2001.  
However, it would be natural to expect that Mexico would tend to reallocate its 
resources towards sectors where it remained competitive. Thus, the fact that 
cointegration would break down in some specific manufacturing activities where 
Mexico lost competitiveness does not necessarily imply that cointegration at an 
aggregate level should break down too after China joined the WTO. This hypothesis 
could not be tested in Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005), however, due to two features 
of the data used: i) we had only two and a half years of data corresponding to the period 
                                                 
1  For evidence on this point, see Chiquiar, Fragoso and Ramos-Francia (2008). 
  1after China’s entry to the WTO; and, ii) the Mexican aggregate manufacturing 
production index used had weights based on Mexico’s 1993 production structure and, 
therefore, did not take into account the changes that this structure may have suffered 
after NAFTA and after China’s entry to the WTO. 
We are now in a position to readdress these issues with better data. In particular, 
we now have six years of data after China entered the WTO, and Mexico’s National 
Statistics Institute (INEGI) has recently published a new manufacturing production 
series based on the 2003 production structure of this country. As we will see below, the 
results that we obtain using this new series suggest that the weakening of the business-
cycle synchronization between the U.S. and Mexico’s manufacturing sectors after China 
joined the WTO sees to have been temporary. This seems to reflect the fact that 
Mexico’s production structure changed after this shock, becoming increasingly 
specialized in product categories in which this country remained competitive. 
The rest of the note is organized as follows. In Section 2 we update the analysis 
in Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005) corresponding to the aggregate-level 
cointegration of Mexico and U.S. manufacturing sectors, using the same series as in that 
paper, but updating them to 2007. We show that the results would suggest, in fact, that 
the weakening between both countries’ manufacturing cycles was permanent. In Section 
3 we provide evidence that the Mexican manufacturing sector indeed reacted to the 
increase in competition on the U.S. import market by shifting resources towards sectors 
where it remained competitive. In Section 4 we replicate the exercises in Section 2, but 
using the new series based on the 2003 production structure. This is done to show that, 
once we use data that take into account Mexico’s new production structure, the results 
in Section 2 tend to be overturned. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Analysis using data with the old 1993 base 
In this section, we update the analysis in Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005) 
concerning the existence of cointegration between Mexico’s and the U.S.’s 
manufacturing industries and the stability of this relationship, using the same series as 
in that paper but including more recent data. In particular, whereas in the cited paper 
this analysis was carried out for the period going from the first quarter of 1996 to the 
second of 2004, here we update the series up to the fourth quarter of 2007. However, in 
this section we continue using Mexico’s manufacturing series that have 1993 weights.   
  2It is first relevant to illustrate how, using Mexico’s manufacturing series based 
on the 1993 production structure, the updated series would seem to suggest that a 
downward permanent shift in the long-run relationship between Mexico and U.S. 
production levels had occurred. This is illustrated in Figure 1. As may be noted, 
according to these series a downward shift in Mexico’s relative output levels seems to 
have occurred after 2001. More importantly, this relative shift would seem to have 
persisted up to the end of 2007. As will be seen immediately below, a cointegration 
stability analysis using these particular series would tend to confirm this view.  
As stated in Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005), after NAFTA went into effect, 
Mexico’s manufacturing sector seems to have become cointegrated to the U.S. 
manufacturing sector. This conclusion is supported by a cointegration test between 
Mexico and U.S. manufacturing production indexes, using updated series up to the last 
quarter of 2007. The results, shown in the left hand side of Table 1, suggest that there is 
a long-run relationship between these two series in which these two series tend to move 
in tandem. Indeed, Johansen’s (1991) trace statistic suggests that we can reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration between the manufacturing series in both countries. 
Furthermore, the cointegrating coefficient between Mexican and U.S. manufacturing 
production levels is close to 1.  
It is relevant to emphasize that we obtain the same pattern of results when we 
use series that intend to reflect more accurately the nature of the relationship between 
these economies. In particular, in the right hand side of Table 1 we report the results of 
a similar analysis as above, but after having excluded high-technology products from 
the U.S. manufacturing production series and the automobile sector in both Mexico and 
U.S. data. This is made to account for the facts that only a very small percentage of 
Mexican manufacturing is dedicated to high-technology products and that automobile 
manufacturing in both countries may respond to specific idiosyncratic factors.  
As in Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005), we now assess the stability of the 
dynamic relationship between Mexico and U.S. manufacturing production indexes 
estimated before. Given the limitations posed by the fact that the apparent structural 
change in this relationship was relatively recent when we conducted the analysis, in that 
paper we had to rely on end-of-sample structural break tests. Given the currently 
available information, however, this is no longer the case. We therefore test the stability 
of the dynamic relationship between Mexico and U.S. manufacturing production 
  3indexes using Seo’s (1998) stability test for Vector Error-Correction models (VEC) with 
an unknown breakpoint.  
The particular tests we illustrate here have as a null hypothesis the non-existence 
of structural breaks in the set of cointegrating and adjustment parameters (α,β) of the 
VEC model characterizing the dynamic behavior of the two series. If the maximum 
value of the test statistic (SupLM) obtained across the sample (after trimming the 15% 
initial and final segments of the sample) is above the 10% critical value for this test, we 
conclude that there exists evidence of instability in the dynamic relationship between 
Mexico and U.S. manufacturing production indexes. 
Figure 2 summarizes the results. As may be noted, the stability tests on the 
bivariate dynamic relationship between Mexico and U.S. manufacturing production 
indexes, when using the Mexican index based on the 1993 production structure, suggest 
that there has been a structural change. Indeed, the null hypothesis is rejected both for 
the whole manufacturing sector data and for the adjusted series that do not include the 
high-tech industries in the U.S. and the automobile sector in both countries. These 
results are consistent with the findings described in our previous paper. 
 
 
3. Mexico’s comparative advantages and export specialization in the U.S. market 
According to the previous results, the conclusions in Chiquiar and Ramos-
Francia (2005) are roughly unchanged, even once we include two and a half more years 
of observations to the data set. As mentioned before, however, the manufacturing 
production index used in the previous section does not take into account the changes in 
the production structure of Mexico after NAFTA nor after China entered into the WTO. 
In this context, the evidence from Mexico’s export structure suggests that this 
country did in fact modify its specialization patterns after the shock it suffered from 
China’s entry to the WTO.  This is illustrated in Figure 3, which is based on data from 
the U.N.’s "Commodity Trade Statistics Database" (COMTRADE) database. We plot 
the change in the share within overall Mexico’s manufacturing exports to the U.S. of 
each of 61 comprehensive manufacturing categories (2-digit level SITC classification) 
for the period 2001-2006, against the corresponding initial (2001) revealed comparative 
advantage index (RCA) within the U.S. market. The RCA index for each product 










































i RCA Mexico’s revealed comparative advantage within the U.S. in good i. 
=
Mexico
i X  value of Mexico’s exports to the U.S. of good i. 
=
World
i X  value of world exports to the U.S. of good i. 
 
The figure includes the corresponding linear and Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients. One or two asterisks are added when such correlation coefficients are 
statistically significant at a 10 or 5% level, respectively. As can be seen, there is a 
significantly positive correlation between the initial comparative advantage of Mexico 
in the U.S. market and the growth of exports towards that market in the following 6 
years. This correlation seems to be especially strong either if we use the usual linear 
correlation coefficient and we drop two outliers (apparel and office machinery), which 
are two sectors that were particularly affected by Chinese competition, or if we use the 
Speraman’s rank correlation coefficient.  
What these results suggest is that in the years following China’s entry to the 
WTO, Mexico adjusted its export structure in favor of product categories in which it 
exhibited a larger comparative advantage index at the time of the shock. Thus, using an 
index based on Mexico’s 1993 manufacturing production structure to assess its degree 
of synchronization with the manufacturing sector in the U.S., as was done in the 
previous section, could be masking the degree to which Mexico’s output could be in 
fact adjusting to the U.S. output levels through changes in its sectoral composition.    
 
  
4. Analysis using recently-published data with a 2003 base 
Fortunately, INEGI has recently published a new manufacturing production 
series based on Mexico’s 2003 production structure.
2 This index may be therefore 
                                                 
2 INEGI published this series for the period going from 2003 to the first quarter of 2008. For the 
econometric analysis, we therefore needed to join it with the previous series (with a corresponding base 
year change) to complete a full series starting in 1996. Note, however, that the differences between the 
  5giving a larger weight to those sectors in which Mexico has increasingly specialized in 
recent years than the index used in Section 2. This, in turn, could imply a different 
dynamic relationship between Mexico and U.S.’s manufacturing production indexes, as 
compared to the relationship identified using the old index. Indeed, Figure 4 compares 
the same data that was illustrated in Figure 1 above, which uses the old index, with an 
equivalent graph using the new index. As may be noted, whereas the old index would 
suggest that the downward relative shift in Mexico’s production after 2002 was 
permanent, the index based on the 2003 output structure instead suggests that Mexico 
started to catch up to its previous relationship with the U.S. output levels in 2005. Thus, 
in contrast with the old series, the new series suggests that the downward relative shift 
in Mexico’s production after 2002 was transitory. Taking into account that the analysis 
in Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005) used data up to the first half of 2004, which is 
before the period when the new series seems to have started to converge again towards 
its previous relationship with the U.S. output levels, it is clear that even if we had the 
new data series available at the time when we conducted the analysis in that paper, our 
conclusions would have been roughly the same. It is thus the combination of using the 
new series based on the 2003 output structure and the fact that we now have a much 
longer sample period what seems to lead to new conclusions. 
To formalize the discussion above, we now repeat the analysis made in Section 
2, but using the new manufacturing series with base 2003. The sample period remains 
as before. Once more, we present cointegration tests for both the whole manufacturing 
sector and for series that exclude high-tech from the U.S. and the automobile industry 
from both countries.  
As shown in Table 2, the results with the new base year are roughly similar to 
those obtained before and, in particular, suggest the existence of a long-run relationship 
between aggregate manufacturing production in Mexico and the U.S. While the 
adjustment coefficient for Mexico’s production during the period 2002-2007 is only 
significant at a 15% level, this seems to be a consequence of the smaller sample used for 
this particular period since, as will be seen below, there is no evidence that there has 
been a structural break in this dynamic relationship. The results using the series that 
exclude high-tech from the U.S. and the automobile industry in both countries do not 
seem to be affected by this. In this case, we again find strong evidence of a log-run 
                                                                                                                                               
1993 and 2003 base series that we highlight in this note correspond specifically to the period going from 
2003-2007, for which the data under the new production structure is indeed available from INEGI.    
  6relationship in which Mexico’s output tends to move in tandem with the U.S.’s 
manufacturing production levels. 
In contrast with the results shown in Section 2, the VEC stability tests using the 
index with the new base do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of stability, either 
for the total manufacturing sector indexes or for the modified series (see Figure 5). 
Thus, using the new production index, the evidence suggests that the shock that 
Mexico’s manufacturing production suffered after China’s entry to the WTO was 
temporary. Comparing these results with those obtained in the previous sections 
suggests that this seems to have been a consequence of Mexico’s reallocation of 
resources towards sectors in which it remained competitive. This can be the case even 
if, as suggested by Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005), a weakening of the link 




In a previous paper, we found that the entrance of China to the WTO caused an 
apparent weakening of the degree of business cycle synchronization between the 
manufacturing sectors of Mexico and the U.S. However, due to: i) the short time that 
had elapsed between the period in which China joined the WTO and the moment when 
we conducted the analysis in Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005); and, ii) the base year 
of the Mexican series we used in that paper, we were not able to establish if this 
weakening was permanent or transitory.  
Using longer time series and a new production index that reflects to a greater 
extent Mexico’s current production structure, in this note we obtain results that suggest 
that the apparent weakening of the business-cycle synchronization between the U.S. and 
Mexico’s manufacturing sectors after China joined the WTO seems to have been mainly 
temporary. This, in turn, appears to be a consequence of the fact that Mexico’s export 
structure changed after this shock, becoming increasingly specialized in product 
categories in which this country remained competitive. 
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  8Figure 1. Manufacturing Production in Mexico and the United States 

























































































































                    
 Source: Federal Reserve and INEGI. 
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  10Figure 3. Mexico’s Revealed Comparative Advantages  


























































































Linear 0.0239 0.412 **
Rank (Spearman) 0.3131 ** 0.409 **
Full Sample W/o Outliers
 
Note: Based on 2-digit SITC (61 groups)  
Source: COMTRADE database, United Nations. 
 
 
  11Figure 4. Manufacturing Production in Mexico and the United States 
Index 2000=100, Seasonally Adjusted 
 






















































































































































































































































       Source: Federal Reserve and INEGI. 
 
 



























































































































Without Automobile and High Tech
Critical 10% supLM (joint)
  13Table 1. Cointegration between the logs of Mexico (1993 base) and U.S. Manufacturing 















Mexico (1993 base, without automobile industry)
and U.S. (without automobile and hi-tech)
1996-2001 2002-2007 1996-2007 1996-2001 2002-2007 1996-2007
Mexico (1993 base) and U.S.
 
Notes. The trace statistic corresponds to Johansen’s test for the null hypothesis of no-cointegration. The number of 
lags for this test was selected according to Akaike’s criterion. The Mexican production adjustment coefficient and the 
long run relation with the U.S. production were estimated from a uni-equational dynamic model estimated with non 
linear least squares and specified according to a general to specific reduction methodology. 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
  14Table 2. Cointegration between the logs of Mexico (2003 base) and U.S. Manufacturing 
Production during 1996-2007 
1.004*** 0.999*** 1.247*** 1.003***












1996-2007 1996-2001 2002-2007 1996-2007
and U.S. (without automobile and hi-tech)
Mexico (2003 base, without transport equipment)
Mexico (2003 base) and U.S.
 
Notes. The trace statistic corresponds to Johansen’s test for the null hypothesis of no-cointegration. The number of 
lags for this test was selected according to Akaike’s criterion. The Mexican production adjustment coefficient and the 
long run relation with the U.S. production were estimated from a uni-equational dynamic model estimated with non 
linear least squares and specified according to a general to specific reduction methodology. ***, **, * and a represent 
significance at 1%. 5%, 10% and 15%, respectively. 
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